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We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from
ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In
quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be exploited by an eavesdropper to perform a faked-
state attack giving her full knowledge of the key without being noticed. We consider the attack on
standard BB84 protocol and a subcarrier-wave scheme, and outline a possible countermeasure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) technology allows to
securely distribute symmetric keys between two parties
by utilizing fundamental aspects of quantum physics [1].
In theory, legitimate users (Alice and Bob) are able
to detect any eavesdropping in the quantum channel
performed by Eve. Today security of several QKD
protocols has been unconditionally proven [2]. However,
in practice Eve is still able to obtain information about
quantum keys without alarming Alice and Bob by
exploiting loopholes in QKD hardware, which are not
taken into consideration during the security analysis.
This technique is referred to as “quantum hacking” and
has been experimentally demonstrated with a variety of
QKD components [3–14]. These results have helped to
further solidify QKD security by patching the loopholes
or extending security analysis. It is therefore important
to continue testing other QKD devices in order to
develop efficient hacking countermeasures.
A particular QKD component found to be vulnerable
to quantum hacking is a single-photon detector [6, 12, 15–
23]. For field applications in urban infrastructure, where
the QKD nodes are located at medium distances (up to
100 km), it is most practical to use single-photon registra-
tion systems based on avalanche photodiodes (APDs) [24]
because they provide sufficient efficiency without use of
complex cooling systems required for superconducting
detectors [25]. Several experiments demonstrated that
Eve can take full control over the detector by blinding it
by an intense continuous wave (c.w.) laser and then send-
ing additional trigger pulses in order to achieve control-
lable clicks at desired times. Combining this method with
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measuring photon states send by Alice allows Eve to se-
cretly obtain full knowledge about the quantum key [22].
This quantum hacking technique is known as a faked-
state attack [6, 22, 26]. It has been implemented on sev-
eral commercially available APDs [6, 12, 16, 21, 27].
The purpose of this work is to investigate the vulnera-
bility to the faked-state attack of another single-photon
detector, ID Quantique ID210, which is currently com-
mercially available [28] and has recently been used in
several QKD setups [29–31]. Notably some of these ex-
perimental schemes are based on subcarrier-wave (SCW)
QKD architecture where quantum states are formed at
spectral sidebands of an intense light through phase mod-
ulation [32]. In SCW QKD systems a major fraction
of the signal is filtered out before detection. Therefore
another important task is to calculate realistic blinding
parameters for SCW systems with ID Quantique ID210
detector. We have found that these setups are potentially
susceptible to the faked-state attack.
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In our tests we have used ID210 single-photon detector
by ID Quantique based on InGaAs/InP APD (unit serial
number 1119019J010) [28]. To simulate realistic condi-
tions for Eve’s attack, we have treated the detector as a
black box in the course of all experiments. We have not
opened its housing nor manually interfered in operation
of any internal circuits. All APD settings have been at
the values normally used in SCW QKD operation [30]:
quantum efficiency 10%, gating frequency 100 MHz, gate
width 3 ns, deadtime 100 ns. For these settings, the dark
count rate fluctuates around 200 Hz. All the parameters
have been set using standard ID210 user interface from
the front panel of the device.
Experimental setup for testing the detector for control
by bright light is shown in Fig. 1. The APD is externally
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FIG. 1. Experimental setup for testing the detector. L,
laser; AWG, arbitrary waveform generator; VOA, variable op-
tical attenuator; OPM, optical power meter; OEC, optical-to-
electrical converter; OSC, oscilloscope; APD, avalanche pho-
todiode single-photon detector ID Quantique ID210.
gated by an arbitrary waveform generator (AWG 1; Ag-
ilent 81110A) at frequency of 100 MHz. This value is
typical for SCW QKD schemes [30, 32]. Another gen-
erator (AWG 2; Highland Technology P400) is synchro-
nized from AWG 1 and performs two functions. Firstly,
it provides constant current to a continuous laser source
(L1; Alcatel 1905 LMI) used for APD blinding. Sec-
ondly, it is driving the trigger pulse laser (L2; Gooch &
Housego AA1401) at 10 MHz rate. This value is lower
than the gating frequency, because in realistic conditions
only a small fraction of pulses emitted by Alice (no more
than 10%) reach Bob’s single photon detector. L1 and
L2 outputs are connected to variable optical attenuators
(VOA 1; OZ Optics DA-100-3S-1550 and VOA 2; FOD
5418) that regulated output optical power. VOA outputs
lead to fiber-optic beam splitter with a 50:50 ratio. One
beamsplitter output arm is connected to an optical power
meter (OPM; Joinwit JW3208), while the other leads to
the ID210 detector (APD). The power meter monitors
optical power applied to the APD from L1 and L2. We
have taken into account a non-ideal beamsplitting ratio
when calibrating this power. At the second stage of ex-
periment, we have substituted OPM with an optical-to-
electrical converter limited to roughly 2 GHz bandwidth
(OEC; LeCroy OE555), in order to accurately determine
an optical pulse shape of L2. The electrical signals from
OEC and APD are measured by an oscilloscope (OSC;
LeCroy 820Zi). Trigger pulse energy is calculated from
average optical power registered by OPM divided by the
pulse repetition rate.
III. RESULTS
Our first task has been to find out if ID210 is suscepti-
ble to blinding. To do this, we have used L1 to generate
c.w. laser radiation directed to APD optical input (with
L2 switched off). L1 optical power has been regulated by
VOA 1. When optical power at APD input has exceeded
24 nW, we have registered a complete absence of dark
counts that indicates successful blinding of ID210 detec-
tor by c.w. radiation. The blinding does not harm the
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FIG. 2. Oscillograms of the APD gate signal (provided at
ID210 front-panel output) and the optical trigger pulse. Their
relative timing is shown here as an assumption. The optical
pulse width shown is limited by the bandwidth of OEC, i.e.,
the actual pulse is shorter.
detector in any way, as its parameters return to normal
each time L1 is turned off.
Blinding the APD implies switching it from Geiger
to linear mode by bright illumination. After that Eve
can take full control over detector clicks by exceeding
a current threshold at a comparator in the linear mode
by sending trigger pulses of sufficient energy along with
c.w. blinding radiation [6]. Therefore our second step has
been to determine the necessary trigger pulse parameters
and synchronize these pulses with APD gates.
We have initiated trigger pulses by turning on L2 with
5 ns wide pulses at 10 MHz frequency. The latter value
has been chosen as a maximum expected detector click
frequency given 100 ns deadtime. The shape of the op-
tical trigger pulse is important for accurately adjusting
the delay between the “faked state” and the detector gate
(Fig. 2). Its measured duration is less than 500 ps full-
width at half-magnitude (FWHM). Meanwhile, FWHM
of the gate pulse matches the preset gate width of 3 ns.
We have then adjusted the timing of our optical trigger
pulse to minimize its energy required to produce a click
in the blinded regime, which presumably aligns it with
the middle of the gate.
Our next step has been to determine a maximum trig-
ger pulse energy Enever at which the blinded detector still
clicks with zero probability, and minimum energy Ealways
at which it clicks with unity probability. When the trig-
ger pulse energy Etrigger is increased, the click probability
undergoes a transition, shown in Fig. 3 for several blind-
ing powers. For example, under 35 nW c.w. blinding, the
detector never clicks when Etrigger ≤ Enever = 15.4 fJ and
always clicks when Etrigger ≥ Ealways = 25.8 fJ. At higher
blinding powers, a click probability transition from 0 to
1 becomes more abrupt, which is apparent by comparing
the plots for c.w. blinding of 35 and 2512 nW that have
310−14 10−13
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Trigger pulse energy (J) 
C
lic
k 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
35
255
1660
2512
3048
4560
Blinding power (nW)
FIG. 3. Detector click probability in the blinded regime as a
function of control pulse energy.
been measured with a higher resolution to illustrate this
effect.
The last step of characterizing the APD is defining
the boundary values for trigger pulse energies that Eve
can use to carry out the most efficient faked-state attack.
Reference 12 describes in detail the methodology we use
here for estimating these values. Let us consider BB84
protocol with four states in two orthogonal bases [1].
When Eve performs the faked-state attack, there are two
possible detection outcomes: either Eve and Bob choose
the same bases, or not. Eve wants Bob’s detector to al-
ways click in the first case, and never in the second. She
can achieve it by imposing a limitation on her Etrigger,
making it sufficient to induce a click only when Bob’s
basis choice is the same as hers [6]:
Ealways ≤ Etrigger ≤ 2Enever. (1)
Figure 4 illustrates these boundaries for the analyzed
ID210 detector: any trigger pulse energy between Ealways
and 2Enever, indicated by a shaded area, can be utilized
for a successful attack. When Eve uses Etrigger values
from this interval, and Bob chooses the same basis, the
eavesdropper will fully control the APD response and
possess information on every key bit. When their bases
do not coincide, a click will never happen, and these in-
stances will be discarded by Alice and Bob during sifting
stage. Thanks to this approach, Eve imposes on Bob only
the states that she knows, and acquires full information
about the quantum key. Hence, we have shown that an
eavesdropper can perform a successful faked-state attack
on ID210 single-photon detector in a realistic scenario of
BB84 protocol.
IV. ATTACK ON SUBCARRIER-WAVE QKD
The investigated detector has recently been employed
in several QKD experiments [30, 31] based on SCW prin-
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FIG. 4. Click thresholds of investigated ID210 detector under
different blinding powers. Ealways is a minimum pulse energy
at which the detector always clicks and Enever is a maximum
energy when it never clicks. Shaded area shows the range of
trigger pulse energies Etrigger of the perfect attack (limited
above by 2Enever).
ciple [33]. This QKD scheme is promising as a backbone
for large-scale quantum network thanks to its high ca-
pability for multiplexing [34, 35] and robustness against
environmental influence on the optical fiber [32, 36, 37].
In this type of systems the encoding photons are not di-
rectly generated by an attenuated laser source but rather
appear on spectral sidebands during a phase modulation
of light. As can be seen from a general scheme of SCW
QKD setup (Fig. 5), the signal spectrum passes through a
narrow filter (SF) before detection in order to remove the
optical carrier that contains most of the optical power. It
is therefore important to investigate if this filtering is an
obstacle for Eve’s detector control and faked-state attack
on SCW QKD setups. In realistic conditions we should
also consider insertion losses in Bob.
For our analysis we have used SCW QKD experimen-
tal parameters from Ref. 32: loss in Bob module 6.4 dB,
SF extinction ratio 30 dB, and modulation index (the
ratio between optical power in the carrier and the two
sidebands) of 20. Let Eve prepare the signal states in a
way similar to Alice: a spectrum with a strong carrier
and two subcarriers. This spectrum will pass through
the receiving unit undergoing the same modulation and
filtering as the normal Alice’s signal. Knowing the sub-
carrier power levels sufficient to blind the detector, we
can estimate the total power that Eve should send into
Bob module for successful blinding. For instance, let us
consider the lowest blinding power of 35 nW confirmed
experimentally in this work. In the SCW QKD scheme,
before the pulse reaches the APD, it must undergo phase
modulation at PSM2, where only 1/20 of the initial op-
tical carrier power is directed into the sidebands that
will subsequently pass the SF. Therefore initial power at
PSM2 input should be at least 700 nW. Likewise, we
should consider insertion loss in Bob’s module (6.4 dB),
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FIG. 5. Subcarrier-wave QKD scheme. Components shaded
red (gray) are introduced as a countermeasure, as described
in Sec. V. PSM, electro-optical phase shift modulator; ATT,
optical attenuator; C, circulator; SF, spectral filter; APD,
avalanche photodiode; M, fiber-optic mirror; D, photodetec-
tor. Insets show optical spectra at different points.
TABLE I. Calculated parameters for successful control of
ID210 detector in SCW QKD scheme.
Eve’s faked-state
power in...
Blinding
power (nW)
Ealways (fJ) Enever (fJ)
subcarriers after
filtering
35 25.8 15.4
spectrum before
modulation
700 516 308
spectrum entering
Bob’s module
3056 2252 1345
therefore the minimum power used by Eve for a success-
ful attack should be at least 3056 nW. A similar logic
works for the trigger pulse energy, as summarized in Ta-
ble I. As can be seen, although Eve must operate with
higher blinding powers and trigger pulse energies in order
to control the detector in SCW QKD scheme, the power
levels needed are still sufficiently low not to damage any
optical components [13]. These results suggest that SCW
QKD setups do not have enough intrinsic loss to prevent
detector control using the described method.
V. COUNTERMEASURES
The faked-state attack is very general and has been
successfully used for hacking different APDs. The
most efficient countermeasure against it is implementing
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD architec-
ture [38], where the detection unit is moved from Alice
and Bob to an untrusted party Charlie. MDI QKD pro-
tocol is based on Bell state measurements and ensures
that Charlie (or Eve) is limited to openly announcing
the measurement outcomes and is incapable of acquir-
ing secure key information. Unfortunately, in practice
MDI QKD architecture remains difficult to implement
and yields much lower key rates.
In traditional two-party QKD, attempts to produce
a countermeasure of a similar quality integrated with a
security proof have led to stringent requirements on com-
ponents [39, 40], which have not yet been implemented.
Simpler countermeasures that utilize photon counting
statistics have been proposed but none yet battle-tested
[41–43]. A more practical countermeasure may imply re-
designing an avalanche quenching circuit of the APD and
introducing precise photocurrent sensors into it [44–49].
Here we propose a simple solution for the SCW QKD
scheme analyzed in Sec. IV. As explained above, in
SCW QKD intense optical radiation acts as a carrier for
the phase-modulated quantum signal on its sidebands.
Even though the carrier contains no information about
the key, in practical QKD it is necessary to detect it
as a countermeasure against a photon-number-splitting
attack [50]. We propose to reveal APD blinding by mon-
itoring this signal. Our system contains a circulator used
to measure the carrier and sideband signals individu-
ally (Fig. 5). Since the faked-state attack requires sig-
nificantly elevated carrier optical power (see Table I), a
watchdog detector D can be installed for monitoring its
abnormally high values. We presume that one cannot
put an unprotected detector into a third port of the cir-
culator, as it could be potentially blinded by Eve there.
We therefore suggest to place it in a fourth port and pro-
tect it by an attenuator and a mirror in the third port, as
shown in Fig. 5. The attenuation value should be care-
fully chosen to be high enough to prevent blinding of D
but sufficiently low to allow carrier detection by a regular
photodiode. Testing this idea can be future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated experimentally that ID Quan-
tique ID210 single-photon detector based on avalanche
photodiode is vulnerable to blinding and can be con-
trolled by bright light. We have shown that the faked-
state attack will work in SCW QKD systems where a
major signal fraction is filtered out before detection. We
have also suggested a simple optical scheme that could
act as a potential countermeasure in SCW QKD. Over-
all, even though the faked-state attack was introduced
a decade ago, no universal industrial-scale solution for
two-party QKD has been found yet. Today MDI QKD
remains the only strictly proven countermeasure against
detector hacking. All alternative solutions are still to be
meticulously tested and incorporated into existing secu-
rity proofs. Our results emphasise that known vulnera-
bilities should be addressed at the system design stage,
and any countermeasures thoroughly tested experimen-
tally.
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